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Abstract
This paper presents experimental results showing that four-year-old Mandarin-
speaking children draw free choice inferences from disjunctive statements, though
they are not able to compute inferences of exclusivity for disjunctive statements or
other scalar implicatures. The findings connect to those of Chemla & Bott (under
review) who report differences in how adults process free choice inferences versus
scalar implicatures and, prima facie, the findings pose a challenge to treatments
that attempt to unify inferences of both kinds. Instead, the findings appear to
favour accounts that invoke different analyses for each kind of inference, such as
Zimmerman 2000a, Geurts 2005, and Barker 2010. The results, however, also
support the recent approach in the experimental literature which attributes children’s
failures to compute scalar implicatures to a difficulty with alternatives: children
may lack the lexical knowledge of alternatives, or these implicatures impose such a
high processing cost that children are unable to handle the alternatives necessary
to compute them (Gualmini, Crain, Meroni, Chierchia & Guasti 2001 Chierchia,
Crain, Guasti & Thornton 2001 Reinhart 2006; Barner, Brooks & Bale 2011; Singh,
Wexler, Astle, Kamawar & Fox 2012). If accessing alternatives is the source of
children’s difficulty, then they would be expected to perform better if the requisite
alternatives are made explicit, as sub-strings of the asserted sentences. This is
exactly what we found. Children were able to compute free choice inferences based
on alternatives that were made explicit in the assertion, but children were unable to
compute ‘regular’ scalar implicatures arising from alternatives lacking this property.
We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about the relationship
between free choice inferences and scalar implicatures and children’s knowledge of
alternatives.
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1 Introduction
A long standing puzzle in the semantics/pragmatics literature is how to account
for the fact that disjunctive statements like (1-a) license conjunctive inferences like
(1-b).1
(1) a. Jack may have sushi or pasta.
b.  Jack may have sushi and Jack may have pasta
The fact that we infer (1-b) from (1-a) is surprising, because in modal logic a
sentence of the form ♦(p∨q) does not entail the corresponding sentence ♦p∧♦q.
Moreover, a plain disjunctive sentence like (2-a) never conveys the corresponding
conjunctive inference in (2-b); in fact, it typically conveys its negation, as we will
see.
(2) a. Jack had sushi or pasta.
b. 6 Jack had sushi and pasta
The question, then, is why the addition of an existential modal to a disjunctive
statement suddenly engenders inferences to the corresponding conjunctive sentence,
as illustrated in (1). Inferences like (1-b) are traditionally called ‘free choice infer-
ences,’ the intuition being that sentence (2-a) grants Jack free choice between the
two options.
The derivation of free choice inferences has resulted in two main camps in the
literature. We are interested in adjudicating between the predictions that each camp
makes about the relationship between free choice inferences and scalar implicatures.
Essentially, the difference between the two camps boils down to whether or not free
choice inferences are equated with scalar implicatures. In particular, we have been
investigating the predictions of those who would provide a unified analysis of free
choice inferences and scalar implicatures. By grouping these phenomena together,
the predictions of this camp are that, everything else being equal, we should expect
uniform behavioral findings for both linguistic phenomena. Similar finding are
expected in the acquisition of inferences of both kinds, as well as in adult language
processing when adults are engaged in computing these inferences.
Chemla & Bott (under review) have assessed this uniformity prediction in stud-
ies of language processing with adults, where scalar implicatures and free choice
inferences are expected to manifest similar processing profiles. Taken at face value,
1 See Kamp 1973; Zimmerman 2000b; Geurts 2005; Fox 2007; Barker 2010; Klinedinst 2007; Chemla
2010; Chierchia 2013 among many others.
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however, their results fail to support the uniformity account. Different performance
profiles were observed as adults computed free choice inferences as compared to
scalar implicatures. Following the example of Chemla & Bott (under review),
we have explored the uniformity account in language acquisition. The uniformity
account predicts that, everything else being equal, children should show similar
acquisition profiles in the development of the ability to compute free choice in-
ferences and scalar implicatures. In line with the processing result by Chemla &
Bott (under review), however, the findings from our experimental investigations
also fail to meet the expectations of the uniformity account. At this point, we have
two options. First, we could simply conclude that the uniformity account is wrong.
Alternatively, we could explore a response to the challenge that is posed by the
experimental findings from studies of adults and children. In the second part of the
paper, we pursue the second option. There we formulate a hypothesis about the
observed behavioral differences. Our hypothesis is based on children’s knowledge
of alternatives, following suggestions in the literature, put forward by Chemla &
Bott (under review) and by others (Gualmini et al. 2001; Chierchia et al. 2001; Singh
et al. 2012; Reinhart 2006; Barner et al. 2011). We then sketch the predictions that
this hypothesis makes, and how we are proceeding to test these predictions.
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows. We briefly introduce
free choice inferences and scalar implicatures, and the debate that has ensued
about their relationship. We also explain the different predictions for acquisition
that follow from the different sides of the debate, and we sketch, as an example,
one variant of the uniformity approach that attempts to unify scalar implicatures
and free choice inferences, namely the account offered in Fox 2007. Section 2
describes the experiment, and section 3 discusses the implication of the results and
formulates a possible response from the perspective of the uniformity account, based
on alternatives. Section 4 concludes the paper.
1.1 What are free choice inferences and scalar implicatures?
Consider sentences (3-a) and (3-b). Example (3-a) contains a plain disjunction, and
example (3-b) contains an existential modal. When we hear these sentences we
typically draw the corresponding inferences in (4-a) and (4-b), respectively.
(3) a. Jack had sushi or pasta.
b. Jack may have sushi.
(4) a. Jack didn’t have both sushi and pasta.
b. Jack doesn’t have to have sushi.
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We will call the inference in (4-b) the ‘not-required-to’ inference, and we will call
the inference in (4-a) the ‘exclusivity’ inference. Next consider sentence (5), which
combines an existential modal and a disjunction.
(5) Jack may have sushi or pasta.
Notice that an exclusivity inference is generally derived from (5), so the inference is
that Jack may not have both sushi and pasta. Moreover, we also typically generate
the conjunctive inference in (6).
(6) Jack may have sushi and Jack may have pasta.
This conjunctive inference is surprising because, as we have seen, from a plain
disjunction like (3-a), Jack had sushi or pasta, we never conclude the corresponding
conjunction, that Jack had sushi and Jack had pasta (7-a). In fact, we typically
conclude the negation of (7-a), namely (7-b). Clearly, the existential modal is
responsible, at least in part, for the conjunctive inference from (5) to (6).
(7) a. Jack had sushi and Jack had pasta.
b. Jack did not have both sushi and pasta.
The puzzle is to understand why the conjunctive inference arises when we combine
an existential modal with disjunction. As mentioned earlier, the inference from
(5) to (6) is traditionally called a ‘free choice’ inference, the intuition being that
Jack has been given a free choice between sushi and pasta. Despite the name, this
phenomenon extends beyond sentences with deontic modals, which grant permission.
For example, such inferences extend to sentences such as the example in (8). Here
the sentence expresses epistemic modality.2
(8) a. Jack might be in Sydney or in Wollongong.
b.  Jack might be in Sydney and might be in Wollongong
2 Free choice inferences also arise with existential quantifiers and some generic sentences (see Fox
2007; Klinedinst 2007 and Nickel 2011 for discussion).
(i) a. (This course is very hard.) Some students take three semesters to complete it or do not
finish it at all. (Fox 2007)
b.  some students take three semesters and some students do not finish it at all
(ii) a. Elephants live in Asia or in Africa. (Nickel 2011)
b.  Elephants live in Asia and Elephants live in Africa
4
Children’s knowledge of free choice inferences
One characteristic of all three of the inferences under consideration is that they are
suspendable. For instance, it is clear from the continuation in (9) that Jack doesn’t
have to have sushi. Similarly, we can suspend the exclusivity inference of the first
statement in (10), by adding a continuation that makes it clear that it is possible that
Jack had both sushi and pasta.
(9) Jack may have sushi. In fact, he might even have to have it.
(10) Jack had sushi or pasta. In fact, he might even have had both.
Finally, we can also suspend the free choice inference in the original example in
(1-a), repeated here as (11). As it is clear from the continuation, we are not saying
that Jack has free choice between sushi and pasta; in view of the continuation, there
is only one thing Jack can have, we just don’t remember which one it is.3
(11) Jack may have sushi or pasta. I don’t remember which.
In the present paper we focus on the inferences in (12-b) and (13-b), which are
generally regarded as being scalar implicatures and free choice inferences like that
in (14-b). The question of interest is the relationship between free choice inferences
and scalar implicatures. We turn to this question in the next section.
(12) a. Jack may have sushi.
b.  Jack doesn’t have to have it
(13) a. Jack had sushi or pasta.
b.  Jack didn’t have both
(14) a. Jack may have sushi or pasta.
b.  Jack may have sushi and may have pasta
1.2 The debate & predictions for acquisition
So the question is: What is the relationship between free choice inferences and
scalar implicatures? Two main answers have been offered in the literature. One
approach contends that there is no relation between the two - they are completely
3 Of course, not every inference is suspendable in this way. For instance, a conjunctive sentence like
(i-a) gives rise to the inference in (i-b). But one cannot go on and suspend it as in (ii).
(i) a. Jack had sushi and pasta.
b. Jack had sushi.
(ii) But in fact it might be that he didn’t have sushi.
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different types of inferences. We will call this the ‘ambiguity account’, because it
poses some form of ambiguity in the interpretation of disjunction. Essentially, what
this approach argues is that there is a reading of (15-a) that simply entails (15-b).
In other words, free choice inferences are entailments of certain interpretation of
sentences like (15-a).
(15) a. Jack may have sushi or pasta.
b. Jack may have sushi and Jack may have pasta.
The second approach argues instead that there is an identity relation between free
choice inferences and scalar implicatures - the two inferences are, in fact, the very
same thing. We call this the ‘scalar implicature account.’ On this account, (15-b)
arises from (15-a) as a scalar implicature. We will look a bit more at the details of
these accounts, focusing especially on the scalar implicature (uniformity) account.
But first, let’s spell out the predictions the alternative accounts make for the
acquisition of free choice inferences and scalar implicatures. The ambiguity approach
argues that free choice inferences and scalar implicatures are two completely different
things. Therefore, it makes no clear predictions for acquisition, in the sense that
any two different things could follow different acquisition paths, or they could
accidentally overlap.
The scalar implicature approach, on the other hand, contends that free choice
inferences are scalar implicatures. Therefore, everything else being equal, this
approach makes a strong prediction, as formulated in (16).
(16) Uniformity prediction for acquisition: children should behave uniformly
with respect to free choice inferences and scalar implicatures.
We designed an experiment to test the prediction in (16). Before we turn to the
experiment, it will be instructive to briefly sketch how one can derive free choice
inferences as scalar implicatures.
1.3 A scalar implicature-based approach to free choice
This section offers an example of how free choice inferences can be derived as
scalar implicatures. For the purposes of the example, we will adopt the theory
proposed in Fox 2007, which argues that free choice inferences are a recursive type
of scalar implicature. It should be understood that there are other scalar implicature-
based accounts, and some of them very different from Fox’s theory, including
accounts presented in Klinedinst 2007; Chemla 2010; van Rooij 2010; Franke 2011;
Alonso Ovalle 2005; Chierchia 2013. Moreover, rather than going into Fox’s theory
in detail, we will simply sketch the intuition that underlies the theory.
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It will be useful to begin with the idealized Gricean algorithm for computing
scalar implicatures, as represented in (17).4 As (17) indicates, the basic idea is
that when we hear an utterance, we reason about what the speaker might have said
instead (among a restricted set of competitors). We then conclude that some of these
competitors are false. More precisely, the competitors that are rendered false are
ones that are not already entailed by the speaker’s utterance.
(17) a. The speaker said A.
b. The speaker might have said B.
c. It’s false that B.
For instance, when we hear a disjunctive statement such as (18-a) we reason that the
speaker might have uttered the corresponding conjunctive statement (18-b) instead,
which would have been stronger, so we conclude that (18-b) is false.
(18) a. Jack had sushi or pasta.
b. Jack had sushi and pasta.
How do we proceed from here to computing free choice inferences as scalar impli-
catures? According to Fox (2007), there are two further ingredients. First, we need
to consider more competitors for disjunctions (cf. Sauerland 2004). Second, the
algorithm requires recursivity (see also Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Alonso Ovalle
2005 among others).
The first ingredient is the consideration of more competitors. Take the sentence
Jack had sushi or pasta in (18-a). Not only is this compared to the alternative Jack
had sushi and pasta in (18-b), but it is also compared to the disjuncts it contains:
Jack had sushi in (19-a) and Jack had pasta in (19-b).
(19) a. Jack had sushi.
b. Jack had pasta.
Although these alternatives are stronger that the assertion, if the algorithm in (17)
is applied to these alternatives, the result would be the negation of the statements
in (19), namely the assertion that Jack didn’t have sushi and Jack didn’t have pasta.
Taken together, these negative statements would contradict the original assertion,
Jack had sushi or pasta. Assuming that the speaker believes what she said, we would
4 Fox (2007) does not invoke this kind of pragmatically-based algorithm. In fact, based on observations
about the generation of free choice inferences, he argues for an architecture of the semantics and
pragmatics of scalar implicatures according to which scalar implicatures arise from the compositional
side of meaning and not from the kind pragmatic reasoning sketched in this section. This part of the
theory is not relevant for our purposes, however, so we will ignore it here. In appendix A, we provide
a more accurate reconstruction of Fox’s (2007) account.
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be led to conclude that the speaker is irrational, something we generally avoid.5
Therefore, nothing happens to the alternatives in (19), on the present account.
However, in other cases these additional alternatives become crucial, as we will see.
In addition to a broader range of competitors, the second ingredient of the new
algorithm is a recursive step. The algorithm then assumes the following shape. As
before, when we hear an utterance, we reason about what the speaker might have
said (considering a restricted set of competitors). So far, everything is as it was, i.e.,
as in the algorithm (17). However, according to the new algorithm, we also reason
that, if the speaker had said one of the competitors, that competitor would have come
with it own inferences. So, in making comparisons between the assertion and its
competitors, not only are the plain competitor considered, but the comparisons are
extended to include ones that assess the assertion against each competitor enriched
with its inferences. The conclusion we draw is that the competitors, along with their
associated inferences, are false. The algorithm is represented schematically in (20).
(20) a. The speaker said A.
b. The speaker might have said B.
c. If the speaker had said B, B would have had C as an inference.
d. It’s false that B and C.
To see how the algorithm works in practice, let us return to the example sentence
(21-a), Jack may have sushi or pasta. According to the new algorithm, the target
assertion is compared to each of the disjuncts that are contained in the assertion,
Jack may have sushi (21-b) and Jack may have pasta (21-c). As we saw, if these
disjuncts were compared with the assertion using the older algorithm (17), they were
negated on the threat of contradiction.
(21) a. Jack may have sushi or pasta.
b. Jack may have sushi.
c. Jack may have pasta.
However, using the new algorithm, these competitor are compared with the assertion
only once they have been enriched with their associated inferences. What inferences
are associated with (21-a) and (21-c)? If the question under discussion is what Jack
can have, and if sushi and pasta are relevant to the discussion, then from competitor
(22-a), Jack may have sushi, we would conclude (22-b), Jack may not have pasta.
Similarly, from (23-a) we would conclude (23-b), Jack may not have sushi.
5 Notice that this does not follow from the simple algorithm that we have sketched above why we do
not negate only one of the two disjuncts. Minimally, we need to add the condition that we cannot
conclude that a competitor is false if this leads to the conclusion that another competitor is true.
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(22) a. Jack may have sushi.
b. Jack may not have pasta.
(23) a. Jack may have pasta.
b. Jack may not have sushi.
In (24), we have combined the competitors and their inferences. These are among
the comparison set for the example disjunctive sentence under consideration Jack
may have sushi or pasta.
(24) a. Jack may have sushi but not pasta.
b. Jack may have pasta but not sushi.
Notice that both of the competitors (24-a) and (24-b) are stronger than the original
assertion Jack may have sushi or pasta, so these wind up being negated by our
algorithm. Therefore, we infer (25-a) and (25-b).
(25) a. It’s false that Jack may have sushi but not pasta.
b. It’s false that Jack may have pasta but not sushi.
This is the last piece of the puzzle. From the assertion Jack may have sushi or pasta,
the new algorithm allows us to infer (26) that Jack may have sushi and Jack may
have pasta.
(26) Jack may have sushi and Jack may have pasta.
Following the new algorithm, we are therefore able to derive free choice inferences
as a type of recursive scalar implicature. This concludes a brief sketch of one way
that linguists have attempted to unify free choice inferences and scalar implicatures,
based on Fox 2007. If this unification is on the right track, then the empirical
prediction is that, everything else being equal, children should behave uniformly
with respect to both linguistic phenomena. We turn now to the experiment that we
conducted to test this prediction.
2 The experiment
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Participants
Twenty-two Mandarin-speaking children (mean age 4;3, range 3;7–4;9) participated
in our experiment.
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Figure 1 A free choice trial.
2.1.2 Procedure
We used a Truth Value Judgement task (Crain & Thornton 1998). In this task,
one experimenter acts out a story using toy characters and props and a second
experimenter plays the role of a puppet who says something about what happened
in each story. The child participant’s task is to say whether the puppet was right or
wrong.
2.1.3 Material
The design of the experiment included two conditions, a free choice condition and
a scalar implicature condition. Eight sentences were presented, four per condition.
On a typical trial, Kung Fu Panda and Batman engaged in a racing competition (see
Figure 1). Before the competition, Mr Owl (the judge) explained the rules, telling
Kung Fu Panda that he was only allowed to push the green car, and telling Batman
that he was only allowed to push the orange car. But Kung Fu Panda and Batman
were forgetful, so when the game was about to start, they asked the puppet to remind
them of the rules. The puppet then produced the test sentence, as in (27).
(27) Gongfu
Kung.Fu
xiongmao
Panda
keyi
may
tui
push
lüse
green
xiaoche
car
huozhe
or
juse
orange
xiaoche.
car
‘Kung Fu Panda may push the green car or the orange car.’
The logic of the design is as follows: the relevant rule stated by Mr. Owl was (28),
rendered schematically in (29).
(28) Kung Fu Panda may push the green car but may not push the orange one.
(29) ♦p∧¬♦q
The puppet’s statement, on the other hand, was (27). On its literal meaning, (27) can
be rendered simply as in (30), which is compatible with the rule in (29) (in fact it is
entailed by (29)). However, we have seen that from the disjunctive statement (30)
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we can compute the free choice inference in (31), and this is not compatible with
Mr. Owl’s ruling, as rendered in (29).
(30) ♦(p∨q)
(31) ♦p∧♦q
Therefore, if the child participants compute free choice inferences of the form
in (31), they are predicted to reject the puppet’s statement. On the other hand, if
children do not compute free choice inferences, they are expected to accept the
puppet’s disjunctive statement in (27) as an accurate description of Mr Owl’s ruling.
The very same logic applied in the scalar implicature condition. This condition
came in two types. One testing the ‘not-required-to’ inference and the second tested
the exclusivity inference. On two of the scalar implicature trials, the sentences
contained the Mandarin modal verb keyi ‘may’ as in (32). In the context associated
with the test sentence (32), Mr. Owl states that Winnie the Pooh must eat a green
pepper. In other words, the context validates an assertion of the form p. The
puppet’s statement, on the other hand, is (32), which is of the form ♦p. Again Mr.
Owl’s rule is compatible with the literal meaning of (32) but it is not compatible
with its ‘not-required-to’ inference, ¬p. Therefore, once again, if the child par-
ticipants compute the ‘not-required-to’ implicature they are expected to reject the
puppet’s statement, but if child participants compute the literal meaning, but not the
implicature, then they are expected to accept the puppet’s statement.
(32) Weinixiong
Winnie.the.Pooh
keyi
may
chi
eat
qingjiao.
green pepper
‘Winnie the Pooh may eat a green pepper’.
On the other type of control trials, the sentences contained the Mandarin disjunction
word huozhe ‘or’ as in (33). On one typical trial, a red mermaid found both a red
shell and a blue shell, which validates a statement of the form p∧q. The puppet’s
statement, however, was (33). Again the literal meaning p∨q is compatible with the
events that unfolded in the story, but its exclusivity inference, ¬(p∧q), is not. So,
again, if children compute the exclusivity inference, they were expected to reject the
puppet’s statement, but not if they computed only the literal meaning.
(33) Hongse
red
meirenyu
mermaid
zhaodao-le
find-ASP
baise
white
beike
shell
huozhe
or
lanse
blue
beike.
shell
‘The red mermaid found a white shell or a blue shell’.
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Figure 2 Rejection rate of the puppet’s statement in the two conditions.
2.2 Results
The results are reported in Figure 2. As this figure indicates, children rejected
the puppet’s statement in the free choice condition 91% of the time (on 80 out of
88 trials). By contrast, the same children rejected the test sentences in the scalar
implicature condition only 18% of the time (on 16 out of 88 trials). A Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks Test showed that there was a significant difference between conditions
(z = 4.52, p <.001).
3 General Discussion
In the present experiment, children were found to compute free choice inferences,
but not scalar implicatures. The scalar implicature result is consistent with previous
findings in the literature (Gualmini et al. 2001; Chierchia et al. 2001; Papafragou &
Musolino 2003 among many others). However, the fact that children consistently
computed free choice inferences is a novel finding. Moreover, the comparison
between the two is the most informative part of the result, because this finding
bears on the debate surrounding the relationship free choice inferences and scalar
implicatures.
The findings reveal that children’s behaviour with free choice inferences and
scalar implicatures is not uniform. We have, therefore, two options at this point.
First, we can conclude that the ambiguity camp was right and that free choice
inferences and scalar implicatures are simply two different things. Second, we could
maintain the conclusion of the uniformity account - that free choice inferences are
scalar implicatures - but in this case we are required to invoke some other factor
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in order to explain children’s different behaviour in response to these linguistic
phenomena. While the first strategy is the most straightforward way of accounting
for our results, we think that there are compelling arguments previously raised in the
literature for the scalar implicature-based account (see Chemla & Bott under review
for discussion).
Therefore, in the following, we have chosen to explore a response to the present
findings based on the uniformity account. In particular, we formulate an hypothesis
based on a suggestion by Chemla & Bott (under review) and elsewhere in the
literature, namely that children have access to a restricted set of alternatives Singh
et al. 2012; Chemla & Bott under review; Reinhart 2006; Barner et al. 2011.
3.1 The restricted alternatives hypothesis
In this section, we explore one kind of response that can be made to the data that
challenge the scalar implicature-based approach. We call this hypothesis the ‘re-
stricted alternatives hypothesis.’ The hypothesis has two main ingredients. One is
the observation that the alternatives from which scalar implicatures and free choice
inferences are derived are different. The second is the observation that explicitly
mentioning alternatives helps children to successfully compute their correspond-
ing inferences. Let us start with the first observation - that the alternatives from
which we derived the ‘not-required-to’ inference are different than the alternatives
used to compute scalar implicatures. The alternatives from which we derived the
not-required to and the scalar implicatures in (34-c) and (35-c) from (34-a) and
(35-a) were (34-b) and (35-b), respectively. To obtain these alternatives from the
corresponding assertions, we need to replace the modal or the connective.
(34) a. Jack may have sushi.
b. Jack has to have sushi.
c.  Jack doesn’t have to have sushi.
(35) a. Jack had sushi or pasta.
b. Jack had sushi and pasta.
c.  Jack didn’t have sushi and pasta.
For the free choice inference, on the other hand, we only needed the alternatives
corresponding to the disjuncts.6 In other words, the alternatives that we need for
free choice inferences are substrings of the assertion, while those of other scalar
implicatures are not.
6 This is true in particular in the theory by Fox (2007) but most scalar implicature-based account have
this same property.
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(36) a. Jack may have sushi or pasta.
b. Jack may have sushi.
c. Jack may have pasta.
d.  Jack may have sushi and jack may have pasta.
The second ingredient of the restricted alternatives hypothesis is the observation in
the literature that mentioning alternatives help children compute their corresponding
inferences (Gualmini et al. 2001; Chierchia et al. 2001; Reinhart 2006) For instance,
in Gualmini et al. 2001 children were presented with disjunctive sentences when their
corresponding conjunctions were true. In other words, when the context validated
that Jack had sushi and pasta, the puppet would say (37) and, as previously shown,
children, unlike adults tend to accept this sentence in this context.
(37) Jack had sushi or pasta.
This has been taken as evidence that they do not compute scalar implicatures from
(37). On the other hand, if in the same context children are given both (37) and
(38) by different puppets, they prefer (38). And this can be interpreted, following
Gualmini et al. 2001, as evidence that when children are explicitly provided with the
alternatives, they are able compute their corresponding inferences.
(38) Jack had sushi and pasta.
Finally, let us add the simple observation that if alternatives are contained in the
assertion they are necessarily ‘mentioned’ in the assertion, so to speak. Now, putting
together the two ingredients, we can formulate the hypothesis as in (39) (cf. Gualmini
et al. 2001; Chierchia et al. 2001; Reinhart 2006; Singh et al. 2012; Barner et al.
2011; Chemla & Bott under review).
(39) Restricted alternatives hypothesis: Children compute inferences arising
from alternatives which are substrings of the assertion.
Schematically here is how the restricted alternatives hypothesis in (39) can account
for the findings of the present experiment. The alternatives of free choice inferences
are mentioned in the assertion, in the sense just explained, while those of other scalar
implicatures are not. Mentioning the alternatives help children compute their corre-
sponding inferences. Therefore, we expect a difference in children’s behaviour with
free choice inferences versus scalar implicatures. In sum the restricted alternatives
hypothesis can account for our results, without abandoning the uniformity account.
Of course, just formulating the hypothesis in (39) is not enough. We need
to test its predictions further. There are two predictions in particulars that we
are exploring. The first one is the prediction that other inferences arising from
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alternatives mentioned in the assertion should be computed by children. The second
is the prediction that if we can find free choice inferences that do not arise from
alternatives that are mentioned in the assertion, then children should not compute
them (in the same way as they do not compute exclusivity and ‘not-required-to’
implicatures).
4 Conclusion
We presented experimental findings revealing that four-year-old children can com-
pute free choice inferences, but not scalar implicatures. This is challenging for
the approach that argues that they are the same thing. We explored a response to
this challenge that we called the restricted alternatives hypothesis. This is based
on two ingredients: (a) the alternatives from which free choice inferences arise are
mentioned in the assertion but those of scalar implicatures are not (b) mention-
ing alternatives help children compute their corresponding inferences. There are
two immediate predictions of this hypothesis that need to be tested further. One
prediction concerns other inferences that arise from alternatives mentioned in the
assertion - these are predicted to be successfully computed by children. Second, free
choice inferences that do arise from alternatives that are not explicitly mentioned
in the assertion should, however, not be computed by children. In conclusion, the
present study is an example of how experimental work on acquisition can constrain
theoretical debate. The experiment was designed to address a theoretical approach
that groups free choice inferences and scalar implicatures together. The finding
represented a challenge for this account, because children’s behaviour was not uni-
form across the two kinds of inferences. We have tried to respond to this challenge,
in order to maintain the uniformity account, at least until follow-up experimental
studies are conducted.
5 Appendix A: free choice as recursive scalar implicatures
In this section, we provide the computation of free choice inferences as recursive
scalar implicatures (as in Fox (2007)) in more detail and following more closely the
original implementation. Fox (2007) argues for an exhaustification-based approach
to scalar implicatures (see also Chierchia, Fox & Spector in press; Magri 2011
among many others). In his version of this approach, scalar implicatures are obtained
through an exhaustivity operator, indicated as EXH. EXH applies to a proposition
and its associated alternatives. It affirms the proposition while negating a subset of
the alternatives, the ‘excludable’ ones.
(40) [[EXHA lt(p)]](p) = λw.p(w)∧∀q ∈ E xcl(p,A lt(p))[¬q(w)]
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The excludable alternatives E xcl(p,A lt(p)) are defined as in (41): all the alterna-
tives that are not entailed by the assertion and the exclusion of which does not lead
to the inclusion of another alternative.
(41) E xcl(p,A lt(p)) = {q∈A lt(p) : p* q∧¬∃r[r ∈A lt(p)∧(p∧¬q)⊆ r]}
We can now go back to (42-a) and see how we can derive (42-b) via a recursive
application of the exhaustivity operator above.
(42) a. Jack may have sushi or pasta.
b. Jack may have sushi and may have pasta.
Consider the schematic version of (42-a) in (43-a) and its alternatives in (43-b).
(43) a. ♦(p∨q)
b. A lt1(♦(p∨q)) =

♦[p∨q]
♦p
♦q
♦[p∧q]

The result of exhaustifying (43-a) with respect to (43-b) is (44).
(44) EXH[♦(p∨q)] = ♦(p∨q)∧¬♦(p∧q)
Consider now what happens if we exhaustify again: the alternatives that we have
to consider are the exhaustifications of the alternatives in A lt1, represented in (45).
Notice in particular the exhaustification of ♦p and ♦q, which is carried out with
respect to the alternatives in A lt1. Crucially, in the case of ♦p we negate ♦q and
viceversa.
(45) A lt2(EXH[♦(p∨q)]) =

EXHA lt1[♦[p∨q]] = ♦(p∨q)∧¬♦(p∧q)
EXHA lt1[♦p] = ♦p∧¬♦q
EXHA lt1[♦q] = ♦q∧¬♦p
EXHA lt1[♦[p∧q]] = ♦[p∧q]

At this point, we now exhaustify again with respect to this second set of alternatives
and in this way we obtain the free choice inference ♦p∧♦q. This is because when
we negate the exhaustification of ♦p and ♦q, we obtain a biconditional that, together
with the assertion, entails the conjunction of ♦p and ♦q.
(46) EXHA lt2[EXHA lt1♦[p∨q]] =
[♦(p∨q)∧¬♦(p∧q)]∧¬(♦p∧¬♦q)∧¬(♦q∧¬♦p) =
[♦(p∨q)∧¬♦(p∧q)]∧ (♦p→ ♦q)∧ (♦q→ ♦p) =
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[♦(p∨q)∧¬♦(p∧q)]∧ (♦p↔ ♦q) =
♦p∧♦q
6 Appendix B: two versions of the restricted alternatives hypothesis
Above we discussed the hypothesis in (47) based on the idea that children have a
restricted access to alternatives.
(47) Restricted alternatives hypothesis: Children compute inferences arising
from alternatives which are substrings of the assertion.
There are at least two elements of variation in this hypothesis. First, there is the
question of why children have restricted access to alternatives. The options proposed
in the literature range from lack of lexical knowledge or processing limitation
problems to a combination of the two (see Barner et al. 2011 for discussion).
Secondly, there is a question as to what it is that children do with the restricted set
of alternatives they have access to. One answer to this question is that they simply
do not compute scalar implicatures, as they are lacking the crucial alternatives that
would give rise to them. A different answer is to say that they do compute scalar
implicatures, but these are simply different from those of adults. This second version
is defended and tested further in Singh et al. (2012). In both cases, the idea is that
for something of the form in (48) children can only access the alternatives in (49)
while adults have the set in (50)
(48) p∨q
(49) children’s alternative: {p∨q, p,q}
(50) adults’ alternatives: {p∨q, p,q, p∧q}
The observation by Singh et al. (2012) is that if we apply the recursive exhaus-
tification mechanism by Fox (2007) (cf. Appendix A) to (48) and the children’s
alternatives in (49-a) we obtain the conjunctive inference in (52). On the other
hand, if we do it to (48) and the adults’ alternatives in (50), we obtain the regular
exclusivity inference in (52).7
7 To illustrate, consider what happens when we exhaustify (i) with respect the alternatives in (ii).
(i) p∨q
(ii) A lt1 = {p∨q, p,q}
The result of one round of exhaustification is vacuous as indicated in (iii).
(iii) EXH[p∨q] = p∨q
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(51) p∧q
(52) ¬(p∧q)
The idea, therefore, is that children accept a sentence like (48) in a situation in
which both p and q are true not (only) because they do not compute the exclusivity
inference in (52), but because they compute the conjunctive inference in (51).
Our results are compatible with both versions of the restricted alternatives hy-
pothesis. Moreover, they support the assumption by Singh et al. (2012) that children
can compute recursive exhaustification. We leave for further research experimentally
testing the two versions of the restricted alternatives hypothesis.
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